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Abstract  
The principle of subsidiarity has been introduced in the Union law, as a constitutional 
principle, by the Treaty on the European Union in order to protect the competences and the 
authonomy of the member States from the interferences of the Union (the European 
Community at that moment) in the areas of shared competence. It is not sure today that it has 
succeeded to fulfil this role. Due to their functional nature, the competences of the Union has 
gradually expanded until now. 
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Introduction 
In a previous article1 we have treated those principles of the European Union law 
which constitute means of protection of the human rights; more precisely we have approached 
the most important of them. In the present study we are going to approach the principle of 
subsidiarity, which is destined – at least at first sight – to protect the competences of the 
States against the possible interferences of the actions of the European Union, as far as the 
States and the Union are competent in a field. We shall show the legal definition of this 
principle and the specifications brought to it by Protocols joined to the treaties, the comments 
– favourable or not – made on it by the doctrine and the jurisprudence of the Union related to 
it. We shall not treat procedural aspects related to it, because we did this in a previous 
article2.  
 
Definition and comments 
The principle of subsidiarity has been for the first time introduced in the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community (become later Treaty establishing the 
European Community – TEC) by the Single European Act of 1986 (SEA)3, but it was 
applicable at that moment only in the field of the environment. Here is the formula from the 
art.130R par. 4 of the TEC as introduced by the SEA: "The Community shall take action 
relating to environment to the extent to which the objectives referred to in paragraph 1 can be 
attained better at Community level than at the level of the individual Member States…." 
Later, the Treaty on the European Union (TEU, called then the Treaty of Maastricht) of 19924 
                                               
1 See Carmen-Nora Lazăr, Principiile generale ale dreptului Uniunii Europene – mijloace de protecţie a 
drepturilor omului, in Contemporary legal institutions in the context of the integration in the EU, Universul 
Juridic Publishing, Bucharest, 2012, pp. 101-112. 
2 See Carmen-Nora Lazăr, Rolul parlamentelor naţiionale în tratatele anterioare ale Uniunii Europene şi ale 
Comunităţilor Europene şi în Tratatul de la Lisabona, in Dreptul no. 6/2010, pp. 203-209. 
3 Entered into force in 1987. 
4 Entered into force in 1993. 
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has generalized it, making it a principle which governs the exercise of the Community 
competences; so, the art. 3B al. 2 from the TEC as modified by the TEU provided: “in areas 
which do not fall under its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore 
(emphasis added by us), by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved by the Community”5; this is correlated with the idea affirmed in the art. A (common 
provisions) from TEU that the decisions in the Union are taken as closely as possible to the 
citizen6. We can remark a difference in comparison with the definition from the SEA: while 
this last required only that the Community action be able to achieve the objectives pursued, 
thus it being not necessary that the action of the Community be more satisfactory than that of 
the States, the TEU requires two cumulative conditions; also, while in the SEA only the action 
of each Member State is taken into acount in order to see if it is satisfactory, the definition of 
the TEU does not anymore specify anything in this respect, which will raise a problem (see 
below). The definition given by the actual art. 5 par. 3 from TEU (common provisions) as 
modified by the Treaty of Lisbon of 20077 is maintained in essence: "Under the principle of 
subsidiarity, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and 
local level, but can rather (emphasis added by us), by reason of the scale or effects of the 
proposed action, be better achieved at Union level". The word "therefore" is suppressed8; 
concerning the level of the States, the treaty specifies that it may be the central, the regional or 
the local level, taking into account the territorial structure of the States and the distribution of 
the competences within them; curiously, the word "rather" is not present in other linguistical 
variants of the treaties (those whose language is accessible to us, i.e. those in Spanish, in 
Portuguese, in Romanian, in Italian, in French and in German) and moreover it does not make 
sense. Obviously, the idea mentioned above – that the decisions are taken as closely as 
possible to the citizen – is maintained (in art.1 of the TEU – common provisions). 
 We observe that the subsidiarity is a principle which governs the use of the Union 
conpetences and not their delimitation from those of the States, as the principle of conferral 
does (whose logical consequence it is considered by some authors9). It is applicable all the 
times that it is about non-exclusive competences, which means that, theorically, these 
competences may be shared, of coordination of the economic and employment policies of the 
States, of defining and implementing a common foreign and security policy (which is, in 
essence, also a shared competence) or of coordination/supporting/supplementing of the 
actions of the States in purely national areas10. Previously to the Treaty of Lisbon, though, 
                                               
5 We observe that by using the word “therefore” the treaty wanted to underline a consequence which results 
automatically, necessarily, from the previous idea; or, this is not exact, because if the actions of the States are not 
satisfactory this does not mean that the action of the Community (now the Union) will be automatically 
satisfactory. 
6 See also S. Sieberson, Dividing lines between the European Union and its Member States, "T.M.C. Asser 
Press" Publishing House, Hague, 2008, p. 139. 
7 Entered into force in 2009. 
8 Other authors too consider that this suppression is a progress (see A. von Bogdandy, J. Bast, The federal order 
of competences, in A. Von Bogdandy, J. Bast, Principles of European constitutional law, “Hart” Publishing, 
Oxford-USA-Canada, “C.H.Beck” Publishing House, München, 2009, p. 302). 
9 S. Sieberson, op. cit., pp. 142-143; T. van den Brink, The substance of subsidiarity: the interpretation and 
meaning of the principle after Lisbon, in M. Trybus, L. Rubini, The Treaty of Lisbon and the future of European 
law and policy, “Edward Elgar” Publishing House, Great Britain-USA, 2012, pp. 160-161). 
10 We consider, though, that practically the subsidiarity is not applicable to the other types of competences than 
those shared and that of defining and implementing a common foreign and security policy because it, by 
definition, permits only the intervention at a single level, either of the Union or of the States. Or, in the cases of 
coordination/supporting/supplementing, the intervention takes place at both levels, although it is of a different 
type: the States take a measure (either a policy or an action) and the Union coordinates it for all or supports it or 
 
C. Lazăr 
73 
when a classification of the Community competences did not exist in the treaties and was the 
“creation” of the jurisprudence through the interpretation of the treaties, the principle of 
subsidiarity was difficult to apply11. With regard to the nature of the acts, the question is if the 
subsidiarity mentioned in the art.5 TEU refers only to the legislative acts, thus to the 
legislative competence, or also to the implementing acts, to the implementing competence. In 
our opinion the subsidiarity provided there is applicable only to the legislative competences12, 
because the implementing competences are referred to separately, respectively the delegated 
implementing competences in art. 291 par. 1 and 2 of Treaty on the functionning of the 
European Union (TFEU) and the own implementing competences in various provisions of the 
same treaty (see below). Art. 291 TFEU contains the subsidiarity without affirming it 
expressely: “1. Member States shall adopt all measures of national law necessary to 
implement legally binding Union acts. 2. Where uniform conditions for implementing legally 
binding Union acts are needed (emphasis added by us), those acts shall confer implementing 
power on the Commission or, in duly justified specific cases and in the cases provided for in 
art. 24 and 26 TEU, on the Council”. Concerning the own implementing competences of the 
Union (more precisely of the Commission), i.e. those provided directly by the treaties, they 
are: the adoption of directives or decisions addressed to the States concerning the public 
enterprises or the enterprises with special regime which provide services of general interest 
(art. 106 par. 3 TFEU); the adoption of regulations concerning the right of permanent 
residence of the employees nationals of another State (as a component of the freedom of 
movement; art. 45 par. 3 d TFEU); the adoption of regulations concerning the competition 
(art. 105 par. 3 TFEU); the execution of the Union budget (art.317-319 TFEU). With regard to 
the first the subsidiarity cannot apply because it would not make sense that the States address 
to themselves directives or decisions! With regard to the last the subsidiarity cannot apply 
because it is an exclusive competence of the Union. With regard to the right of residence and 
to the competition13, they contain cross-border elements, the first by its nature, the second by 
hypothesis; it results, thus, that the subsidiarity is not applicable also here, the two provisions 
containing an absolute presumption in favour of the Union level. Moreover, the two Protocols 
on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, annexed to the Treaty 
of Amsterdam and, respectively, to the Treaty of Lisbon, mentioned below, make reference to 
the legislative acts. The difference between the art. 5 and the art. 291 TFEU is that in the case 
of the implementing competences the non-respect of the subsidiarity may not be imputable to 
the implementing act itself, because it is adopted on empowerment by the legislative act, but 
to this last also, as in the hypothesis provided by the art. 5. 
                                                                                                                                                   
supplements it. On the other hand, in the case of the last type of competences the intervention of the Union may 
not be imposed to the States, even if it is necessary; moreover, the treaty itself provides in this case that the 
Union may not supersede the competences of the States. Also, it does not apply to the competences of control or 
of delivering opinions (see the decision of the European Court of Justice – ECJ - "Commission/Germany" 539/09 
of 15.11.2011, http://curia.europa.eu/). The subsidiarity remains thus to apply only to the shared competences 
(including, as we said, the common foreign and security policy). 
11 Josephine Steiner, Lorna Woods, EU Law, "Oxford University Press" Publishing House, New-York, 2009, 
p.61; N. Foster, Foster on EU Law, "Oxford University Press" Publishing House, Oxford, 2009, p. 94. 
12 Despite the defectuous, redundant wording of the art. 2 TFEU: "Only the Union and the states may legislate 
and adopt legally binding acts..." (emphasis added by us), respectively "The Union and the States may legislate 
and adopt legally binding acts..." (emphasis added by us), the notion of legally binding acts covering also the 
implementing acts (be they normative or individual). 
13 We specify that it is about the competition which overcomes the borders of a single State, otherwise the 
competence belongs to the State concerned (according to the art. 3, par. 1 b of the TFEU). 
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In case of doubt with regard to the satisfactory character of the action of the States, the 
provision of the TEU contains a presumption in favour of the inferior level; this result from 
the cumulative character of the conditions required (see below)14. 
Because, according to the opinion of some authors, the mentioned provisions do not 
contain a definition of the principle but of its way of use15 and according to the opinion of 
others the definition is vague, unclear, unprecise16, the Protocol on the application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality joined to the Treaty of Amsterdam of 199717 has 
brought some specifications in the matter and has formulated for the institutions requirements 
with regard to this principle. Thus, in order to verify the fulfilment of the two conditions 
mentioned in the treaty, three criteria must be taken into account: the existence of cross-
border aspects, which cannot be satisfactorily regulated by the States; the action of the States 
or the absence of the action or the Community would conflict with the requirements of the 
treaty (for example the necessity to correct the distorsions of competition, to avoid the 
disguised restrictions brought to the changes or to strenghten the economic-social cohesion) 
or would damage seriously in another way the interests of the States; an action at Community 
level would have obvious benefits in comparison with an action of the States, by reason of its 
scale or effects. In fact a test of comparative efficiency is made18. Although it is sustained that 
it is not clear if the three criteria are cumulative or alternative, in our opinion they may not be 
but alternative, this resulting logically from the manner in which they are fomulated19. Some 
authors consider though that it is not possible to establish a priori clear and abstract criteria 
for the evaluation of the subsidiarity, because all the areas are closely connected between 
them and all have a connection with the common market (the main objective of the treaties, 
n.n.), so that an intervention of the Union shall always be necessary, even if in a reduced 
degree20. Then, in accordance with the Protocol, the form of the Community action must be 
the simplest possible permitted by the adequate attainment of the objectives of the measure 
and by the necessity of an effective execution. It is recommended to give priority to the 
directives over the regulations, respectively to the frame-directives over the detailed 
directives; one can add the recommendations, the guides, the codes of conduct21, all non-
binding instruments for those to whom they are addressed, forming what some call the “soft 
law”; also, the idea contained in the Protocol would impose to have recourse to minimal 
harmonizations, respectively to the mutual recognition instead of harmonization22. Regarding 
the nature and the scale of the Community action, it is specified that the measure must leave 
to the States a margin of action as great as possible but compatible with the requirements of 
the treaties and with the necessity of the attainment of the objectives of the measure; the well 
established national practices and the national legal systems must be respected; the States 
                                               
14 Alina Kaczorowska, EU Law, “Routledge-Cavendish” Publishing House, Great Britain-USA-Canada, 2009,  
p. 102; T. Konstandinides, Division of powers in EU Law, "Wolters Kluwer" Publishing House, Hague, 2009,  
p. 123 
15 T. Konstandinides, op. cit., p. 124 
16 T. van den Brink, op. cit., p. 160-161; N. Foster, op. cit., p. 94; S. Sieberson, op. cit., p. 123; in T. 
Konstandinides, op. cit., p. 121. 
17 Entered into force in 1999. 
18 Josephine Steiner, Lorna Woods, op. cit., p.62; D. Chalmers, G. Davies, G. Monti, European Union law: cases 
and materials, "Cambridge University Press" Publishing House, Cambridge, 2010, p. 364. 
19 In the same sense see J.-P. Jacqué, Droit institutionnel de l’Union Européenne, “Dalloz” Publishing House, 
Paris, 2009, p. 166. 
20 P. Craig, Grainne de Burca, EC Law. Texts, Cases & Materials, “Oxford University Press” Publishing House, 
Great Britain, 2008, p.95; according to the functionalist theory, on which the Communities are founded, the 
necessity to attain an objective in an area imposes the institution of competences in another areas too, because of 
the close connection between them, as the “rule of snowball” works; thus, the competences are based on 
objectives, not on areas. 
21 P. Craig, Grainne de Burca, op. cit., pp. 95-97; Alina Kaczorowska, op. cit., pp. 99-100. 
22 P. Craig, Grainne de Burca, ibidem; Alina Kaczorowska, ibidem. 
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must be offered different solutions for the attainment of the objectives of the measure, subject 
to the ensurance of an adequate execution. The institutions must reason each legislative act 
with regard to the respect of the subsidiarity principle, in the exposé of reasons which 
accompanies it; they must take into account the necessity that each kind of burden 
(administrative, financial, etc.) imposed on the Community, on the States, on the local 
authorities or on the individuals (economic operators or private persons) be as low as possible. 
The Commission, moreover, must proceed to social consultations as large as possible before 
proposing a legislative act. According to the Protocol, the subsidiarity is a dynamic concept, 
which permits both an extension of the Community actions, when the circumstances require it 
and within the limits of its competences, and a limitation or a cessation of these actions, if 
they are not anymore justified23. 
The Protocol having the same object joined to the Treaty of Lisbon maintains the 
requirements previously instituted with regard to the obligation of social consultation, 
specifying moreover that the regional or local scale of the proposed action must be taken into 
account, to the obligation of reasoning of the legislative acts with regard to the subsidiarity 
(but, instead the exposé of reasons, the act must be accompanied by a slip which contains 
elements based on qualitative and, if possible, quantitative indicators which permit the 
evaluation of the proposed measure), to the obligation to take into account that any imposed 
burden be the lowest. We do not mention anymore here the procedure of parliamentarian 
control instituted by the Protocol because, as we have specified in the Introduction, we have 
done it in a previous article. 
Having in view that the principle of subsidiarity is correlated with the idea that the 
decisions must be taken as closely as possible to the citizens – the principle proceeding just 
from this necessity -, it can be sustained that only at a first impression, more precisely that its 
role is only apparently to protect the competences of the States, ultimately the citizens being 
those it concerns. This because the State is not a goal in itself and its competences are tasks 
given in order to satisfy social needs; on the other hand, the democracy supposes that the 
citizens participate to or influence the decision-making; or, the more distant is the level of the 
decision-making, the weaker is the participation or the influence of the citizens (if it exists; let 
us remember that until a given moment the European Parliament, which represents the 
citizens of the Member States, had not a proper power of decision but only an influence, at the 
beginning weak and later stronger, on the decision factors). So that, in our opinion, it cannot 
be sustained, as some authors do, that the principle of subsidiarity is not of a nature to interest 
the citizens because it is indifferent for them at what level the decisions are taken24. 
The principle of subsidiarity has appeared, as it is shown, in a context in which the 
Community competences had very much expanded (either by revisions of the founding 
treaties, or by the use of the flexibility clause – the actual art. 352 TFEU25) and some States 
and the individuals had the impression that they (the competences) can expand undefinitely, 
due to their functional nature; other States, with a federal structure or only regionalized, 
feared that the expansion of the Community competences would affect the balance and the 
distribution of their internal competences; the individuals saw that their life was more and 
more regulated at a more distant level from them; more generally, the States feared that in the 
areas of shared competence their freedom of action would diminish, especially that more and 
more decisions were going to be taken with qualified majority26. Thus, the principle was going 
                                               
23 In this sense an author showed that the subsidiarity is not equivalent to the decetralization, just because it 
allows power either at the superior level or at the inferior one, depending on the necessities (T. Konstandinides, 
op. cit., p. 124; Alina Kaczorowska, op. cit., p. 197). 
24 N. Foster, op. cit., p. 96. 
25 This provision is applicable in the case in which the treaties assign to the Union an objective but they do not 
give it also the corresponding means (the legal acts), the Council being allowed to establish them by unanimity 
26 J.-P. Jacqué, op. cit., pp. 162-164. 
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to refocus the process of exercise of governmental functions from the centre to the 
periphery27, to put an end to the tendencies considered to be federalist of the Community28, 
although it was accepted also by the supporters of the federalism and by those who were 
hostile to such an evolution29. The explanation of its general acceptance is, probably, that it is 
of a nature to lead both to the expansion and to the limitation of the intervention of the Union, 
depending on the necessities, (as the Protocol mentioned above remarks), being both an 
integrationist and an anti-integrationist principle, having thus both a positive and a negative 
aspect30. 
As it was remarked, before being consecrated as such the subsidiarity was (and 
continue to be) implicitely contained in more provisions of the treaties: in the flexibility 
clause provision (see previously), in that related to the implementing competences (see 
previously), in that related to the margin of appreciation of the States when they implement a 
directive (art. 288 par. 3 TFEU), in those related to the mutual recognition between the States 
of the standards, diplomas, certificates etc., in the rule of reason31 with regard to the freedom 
of movement32; in a larger sense, it is considered that also the conferral of competences on the 
Community/Union, both initially and later – by revisions of the treaties -, contains implicitely 
the principle of subsidiarity, this being inherent to any system with more levels of 
governance33. 
Despite of the fact that the principle of subsidiarity is necessary, in our opinion, if the 
preservation of the national authonomy is wanted, it is far to make unanimity in the literature. 
Some authors have considered that it is mistaken, appeared in an improper moment and 
irrelevant for the Union law because it is born in another sphere, that of the relationships 
individual-society-State (for this reason it is also irrelevant for the federal States)34; being 
unclear and unprecisely defined and, for this reason, being difficult to be controlled by 
judicial way, having moreover a defensive nature, it is not able to establish a balance between 
the Union and the States35, it cannot represent an adequate guarantee against the unjustified 
expansion of the Union competences36, it does not meet the concerns for the preservation of 
the competences of the States and it did not succeed to contain the centralizing trend of the 
power37. For these reasons some consider that the proportionality38, respectively the 
sovereignty39 are more important than the subsidiarity; anyway, the subsidiarity is not 
                                               
27 T. Konstandinides, op. cit., p. 118. 
28 P. Craig, Grainne de Burca, op. cit., p. 94. 
29 J.-P. Jacqué, op. cit., p. 161. 
30 Idem, p. 165; P. J. G. Kapteyn e.a., The law of the European Union and the European Communities, Ed. 
Wolters Kluwer, USA-The Netherlands, 2008, p. 171; T. Konstandinides, op. cit., p. 120; other authors define 
inversely the positive and the negative aspect, the first meaning the limitation of the Union competences and the 
second the prevention of the action of the States (and, thus, the permission of the Union action) (see T. 
Konstandinides, op. cit., pp. 124-125). 
31 This concept, (deliberately) incompletely provided in the treaties, was completed by he ECJ through 
interpretation; it refers to the derogations – non-provided by the treaties - which the Member States may bring to 
the freedom of movement under the control of the ECJ, this last having the role to appreciate the reasonable 
character, the rightness of these derogations. 
32 N. Foster, op. cit., p. 93; Alina Kaczorowska, op. cit., p. 97; J.-P. Jacqué, op. cit., p. 160. 
33 J.-P. Jacqué, ibidem. 
34 P.J.G. Kapteyn e.a., op. cit., pp. 139-140. 
35 T. van den Brink, op. cit., pp. 160-161; P. Craig, Grainne de Burca, op. cit., p. 100. 
36 P.J.G. Kapteyn e.a., op. cit., pp. 139-140. 
37 Ibidem; T. Konstandinides, op. cit., p. 120. 
38 T. van den Brink, op. cit., p. 160; P. Craig, Grainne de Burca, ibidem. 
39 P.J.G. Kapteyn e.a., op. cit., pp. 139-140; this because the Union is however an international organization, so 
that in its relationship with the Member States the problem would be that of the respect of the sovereignty and 
not that of the subsidiarity. 
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sufficient to involve the citizens in the decision-making40, idea to which we cannot but to 
subscribe. 
It is to be mentioned also the fact that neither the procedure instituted by the Treaty of 
Lisbon with the view to monitor previously the respect of the principle of subsidiarity has 
been exempted from criticism. Indeed, this procedure encumbers and slows the decision-
making process - despite of the fact that its simplification has been wanted all the time -, 
without the national parliaments being able to block the adoption of an act which is deemed to 
violate the subsidiarity41. If we agree with the criticism concerning this last aspect, we do not 
share it also for the rest. Any democratic process, by the fact that it involves more actors42, is 
par excellence complex and complicated; only the dictatorship is simple! Without the 
ordinary legislative procedure – the former co-decision -, the European Parliament would 
have neither today a decisive word to say in the decision-making process (which has given 
birth to the criticism concerning the "democratic deficit" of the Union). Certainly, even here 
some questions may be raised, for example referring to the obligation of the governments of 
the Member States to represent before the jurisdiction the parliaments of their own States in 
an action based on the non-respect of the principle of subsidiarity, if they do not agree with 
the action43. The Protocol joined to the Treaty of Lisbon provides that the obligation 
mentioned is exercised "in accordance with the legal order of the States". Does this mean that 
the existence itself of the obligation or only the conditions of its exercise depend on the 
provisions of the legal order of the States? In our opinion the answer is the second variant, 
otherwise the provisions of the Protocol would be void of content and the national parliaments 
which want to bring judicial proceedings, if they did not succeed to prevent the adoption of an 
act “accused” to violate the subsidiarity, would be at the mercy of their own governments, 
which would not be normal44. Anyway, it is important that the monitoring of the respect of the 
subsidiarity be made also prior to the adoption of a legislative act, even in the absence of a 
veto from the national parliaments or from another factors, this influencing too the 
effectiveness of the principle45. 
Relatively to the subsidiarity more questions have been raised46. First, the action of the 
States should be appreciated with reference to the actual, present situation, or to the future, 
potential one? We agree with the opinion that, having in view the terms of the treaty, one 
must take into acount what the States could do in the future47. Second, one must take into 
account the action at the level of each State (thus isolately, individually) or, to the extent that 
an agreement is concluded between all the States, the collective action resulted? In other 
words, is the intervention of the Union justified if the objective can be attained by a collective 
action of all the States, given that the action of each State would not be able to attain it? We 
saw that the SEA has referred only to the individual States, so the answer would be clear here. 
The opinions are shared, some sustaining that, although in accordance with the letter of the 
treaties, an agreement between all the Member States violates their spirit, pursuing to attain an 
objective out of the frame of the Union and through an instrument which is not an act of 
Union law but one of international law, thus taken away from the judicial control of the ECJ48; 
                                               
40 J.-P. Jacqué, op. cit., p. 161; this author considers that the problem does not reside in the fact that the Union 
has too many competences, but in their way of use (idem, p. 164). 
41 T. Konstandinides, op. cit., p. 151; S. Sieberson, ibidem; the first author considers even that the procedure 
instituted is destined more to solve the problem of the Union legitimacy than the problem of its competences. 
42 Thing that, moreover, even some critics appreciate as being, though, an advantage (T. Konstandinides, ibidem; 
A. von Bogdandy, J. Bast, op. cit., p. 304). 
43 T. Konstandinides, op. cit., p. 150. 
44 In an opposite sense see A. von Bogdandy, J. Bast, op. cit., p. 303. 
45 T. Konstandinides, op. cit., p. 121. 
46 For all these questions see J.-P. Jacqué, op. cit., pp. 166-168. 
47 Ibidem, pp. 166-167. 
48 In J.-P. Jacqué, op. cit., p. 167 (the author agrees with this opinion). 
SUBSIDIARITY IN THE UNION LAW: A SUCCESS OR A FAILURE? 
78 
others, as well the ECJ itself, consider though that, in so far as the States are (also) competent 
in an area, they may exercise their competence as they want, inclusively by an agreement to 
which all of them are parties, the treaties not instituting restrictions in this respect49. Third, the 
action of the private partners (natural and legal persons) can be taken into account where we 
speak about the action of the States? Theorically, having in view the terms of the treaties, 
which refer to the States, this is not possible50; the individuals may not be assimilated to the 
States, however we force the interpretations. Practically, though, the Commission takes into 
account the measures that the individuals take with the view to attain objectives of the Union 
(for example through agreements between trade associations and employers organizations) 
and gives up to propose legislative acts in that matter51. 
On the other hand, if it is considered that legally speaking the principle has and will 
have only an insignificant impact – i.e. it has not led and will not lead to the reduction of the 
intervention of the Union -, from a political point of view it represents an engagement toward 
democracy and toward decentralization, conferring legitimacy to the Union, in opposition 
with the nationalist trend, which focuses on the legitimacy of the States52. 
Jurisprudence and comments  
 Even from the beginning the problem has been raised if the principle of subsidiarity is 
of a nature to be invoked before the jurisdictions, more precisely before the Union 
jurisdictions. Some authors, arguing its partially political nature53 and the vague character of 
its definition, have sustained that it may not be invoked judicially54, but others have shown 
that the vagueness and the lack of clarity have not made other concepts unable of judicial 
review55; also, the fact that the jurisdiction must appreciate the opportunity and the necessity 
is not an obstacle against the judicial review, which has been and is exercised in other similar 
situations too56, even if it is limited to establish if the institution has not committed a manifest 
error of appreciation. Neither the jurisprudence of the ECJ has followed the first point of 
view, accepting even early57 to review the legislative Community acts (also) with regard to the 
respect of the subsidiarity, although, really, its control has been limited to verify if the acts 
were dully reasoned in this respect58, with the specification that in the point of view of the 
ECJ at that moment the reasoning did not need to be detailed and neither to make an express 
reference to the principle of subsidiarity; the Union jurisdiction has not applied itself, thus, the 
test of comparative efficiency based on the criteria from the Protocol previously mentioned59. 
                                               
49 In J.-P. Jacqué, ibidem; opinion of he ECJ 1/94 of 15.11.1994, http://curia.europa.eu/; decision ECJ 
"Parliament/Council" 316/91 of 2.03.1994, http://curia.europa.eu/; decision ECJ "Commission/Council" 22/70 
of 31.03.1971, http://curia.europa.eu/; decision ECJ "Parliament/Council and Commission" 181/91 of 
30.06.1993, http://curia.europa.eu/; the author cited shows, though, that, because in two of these cases it was 
about competences of coordination and not of shared competences, the reasoning of the Court could not be 
extended to these last; we are not of this opinion, the Court having used general terms ("non-exclusive 
competences", which means all the other types). 
50 J.-P. Jacqué, op. cit., pp. 167-168; in an opposite sense see Alina Kaczorowska, op. cit., p. 151. 
51 J.-P. Jacqué, ibidem. 
52 S. Sieberson, op. cit., p. 143 
53 Because it implies the appreciation of the opportunity and the necessity of a measure 
54 Josephine Steiner, Lorna Woods, op. cit., p.62 
55 In T. van de Brink, op. cit., p. 160 
56 For example in the case of the principle of proportionality 
57 Decision of the ECJ "Great Britain/Council" 84/94 of 12.11.1996, http://curia.europa.eu/; decision of he ECJ 
"Germany/Parliament and Council" 233/94 of 13.05.1997, http://curia.europa.eu/; we mention that in the first 
case the subsidiarity has not been invoked separately but in connection with the legal basis of the act 
58 The obligation of reasoning is a general one, having to be respected for each act, irrespective of its nature and 
rank; also, we mention that the non-respect of the subsidiarity may be invoked in the frame of the existing 
procedures, i.e. in an action in annulment, in a preliminary ruling in validity and through the plea of illegality in 
any type of direct action (see in the same sense Josephine Steiner, Lorna Woods, op. cit., p.62; T. van den Brink, 
op. cit., p. 163) 
59 T. van den Brink, op. cit., p. 163. 
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Subsequently to that Protocol, the jurisprudence has evolved in the sense of the deepening of 
the review, the jurisdiction verifying itself if the requirements of the Community action are 
satisfied with reference to the criteria from the Protocol60. Having in view the provisions of 
the Protocol, it would have been impossible for the ECJ to not take it into account and to not 
evolve from a purely formal review to a substantial one61; all the more after the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon with the afferent Protocol – thus with the new procedure of a 
priori control and with the possibility of the introduction of an action in annulment by the 
national parliaments and by the Comitee of Regions – the ECJ could not maintain its former 
position62. However, as the doctrine remarks, having in view the great power of appreciation 
from which benefit in principle the institutions, even a substantial review is not and cannot be, 
inevitably, but a marginal one, limited to the ascertainment of the existence of a manifest error 
of appreciation; otherwise the jurisdiction should make complex social-economic assessments 
and calculations, which would mean that it substitutes itself for the competent institutions63. 
Moreover, since a measure has been proposed by the Commission and adopted by the Council 
and, in principle, by the Parliament too, its invalidation by the Union jurisdiction by reason of 
the non-respect of the subsidiarity would be equivalent to say to the respective institutions 
that all have been wrong, that all have mistaken about64. We would add that, if a measure is 
taken with unanimity, the jurisdiction must show even more restraint, because it is supposed 
that the subsidiarity protects just the authonomy of the States; or, these have give up to its 
benefit by voting in favour of the measure. Also, the jurisdictions of the Union do not benefit 
from electoral legitimacy and a larger review would curb the development of the competences 
of the Union, i.e. the European integration; if in other respects the ECJ has shown militancy, 
being accused for the “government of judges”, this has happened just in cases in which an 
impulse to the integration, endangered by the inaction of the political decisional factors and 
by the non-respect by the States of the requirements of the treaties, had to be given65. 
 What could be inferred from the jurisprudence so far of the ECJ? From a statistical 
point of view the subsidiarity has been invoked as a ground of nullity66 in few cases from the 
total number of acts adopted by the Union67 and it is to be specified that it was invoked rarely 
alone (probably because the claimants appreciated that otherwise they had few chances of 
                                               
60 Decision of the ECJ “The Netherlands/Parliament and Council” 377/98 of 9.10.2001, http://curia.europa.eu/; 
decision of ECJ “Alliance for Natural Health and Nutri-Link Ltd e.a.” 154-155/04 of 12.07.2005, 
http://curia.europa.eu/; decision ECJ “B.A.T. e.a.” 491/01 of 10.12.2002, http://curia.europa.eu/; decision ECJ 
“Commission/Germany” 103/01 of 22.05.2003, http://curia.europa.eu/; decision ECJ “Vodafone” 58/08 of 
8.06.2010, http://curia.europa.eu/ (even in this period, though, there are decisions in which the reasoning on 
subsidiarity is lacunar or which are limited to the analysis of the reasoning of the act; see decision of the former 
Court of First Instance, actual General Court, “GSK Services Unlimited/Commission” 168/01 of 27.09.2006, 
http://curia.europa.eu/; decision of the ECJ "Commission/Germany" 518/07 of 9.03.2010, 
http://curia.europa.eu/). 
61 T. Konstandinides, op. cit., pp. 136-137. 
62 T. van den Brink, op. cit., p. 164; Alina Kaczorowska, op. cit., p. 65; J.-P. Jacqué, op. cit., p. 168; however, it 
is sustained that in the action in annulment brought by the national parliaments – through their governments – 
the jurisdiction may not review but the respect of the a priori procedure, not other aspects too (see T. 
Konstandinides, op. cit., p. 150); we confess that we do not see on what such an affirmation is based! 
63 P. Craig, Grainne de Burca, op. cit., p.99; J.-P. Jacqué, op. cit., p. 168; P.J.G. Kapteyn e.a., op. cit., p. 143; T. 
Konstandinides, op. cit., pp. 131-136; this last author considers that the treaty itself is ambiguous with regard to 
the scale of the judicial review, it does not result from it if the review must be a purely formal, procedural one 
(i.e. limited to the reasoning of the act and to the respect of the a priori procedure) or also a substantial one 
(idem, p. 152); in our opinion, since it is not specified in the treaty, the review must be complete, i.e. focus on all 
the aspects, even if it is limited with regard to its intensity. 
64 D. Chalmers, G. Davies, G. Monti, op. cit., p.364 and pp. 365-366. 
65 T. Konstandinides, ibidem. 
66 In this respect it is included in the larger ground, i.e. the infringement of the treaties and of the acts adopted for 
their application. 
67 P. Craig, Grainne de Burca, op. cit., p. 100. 
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success); often it was invoked as an accessory ground of the legal basis. Also, an uniformity 
of attitudes between the Member States does not exist. For example, the most times the 
claimants were natural/legal persons, not States, although it is supposed that the subsidiarity 
protects the competences of those! One reason for which the individuals have invoked the 
subsidiarity is that mentioned previously, i.e. the fact that it is not indifferent for them at what 
level the power is exercised. Then, many times some States have intervened in the defense of 
the act (which is not surprisingly if they have voted in its favour), while rarely one State has 
intervened in the defense of the individual claimant68. Finally, the most important observation 
would be that never the jurisdiction has annulled an act exclusively on the ground of the non-
respect of the subsidiarity69. Some authors are of opinion that, even if the review was more 
intense, it would not be sure that the result would be other, i.e. the act would be annulled on 
this ground70. The explanation for the restraint of the Union jurisdiction consists in those 
shown previously; before the Treaty of Lisbon, the fact that the classification of the Union 
competences was just the creation of the jurisprudence was another argument71. 
 These results, not just glad, gives the right to some to sustain that a substantial review 
of the respect of the subsidiarity does not make sense, having to limit itself to formal, 
procedural aspects72. We do not agree with such an affirmation, even we observe that, really, 
so far the jurisprudence is disappointing. Anyway, it is probably that the subsidiarity will 
influence the interpretation of the Union law – with regard to its content and scope -, if it is 
not a ground of invalidity/nullity73. 
 
Conclusions 
 How the result of a few years of application of the principle of subsidiarity can be 
appreciated? In fact it is difficult to say clearly, without no doubt, that the result is positive or 
negative. It is likely, though, that the result is under the expectations. If the jurisprudence is 
really disappointing, we must wait to see how the a priori procedure of the monitoring the 
respect of the subsidiarity by the national parliaments works; it is too early to say something 
in this respect. If the national parliaments, which so far had not any role in the Union 
decision-making process, take seriously their role attributed by the Protocole joined to the 
Treaty of Lisbon, it is sure that the initiators of a legislative act – firstly the Commission – be 
more cautious, more prudent to propose something which does not respect the subsidiarity; 
also, the legislator – the Council or/and the Parliament – will pay more attention to this 
aspect. As a result, it is likely that the jurisprudence will change too and not only with regard 
to the procedural aspects, but also with regard to the substantial aspects.  
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